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The Divided House of Islam

A revived Islam had the potential for both harmony and divisiveness. It often seemed as though the Muslim world swung like a pendulum between two extremes: unified for a brief period, and then sorely split. During 1982 Muslim leaders often denounced one or other of their fellows as an enemy of Islam; followers and opponents of Khomeyni clashed in Islam's holiest sanctuaries. In 1983 a certain weariness with these rivalries was in evidence, and they were pursued with less gusto. There was even one noteworthy reconciliation: between Libya and Saudi Arabia. Still, the various competing networks of Muslim influence—Saudi Arabia, Iran, Libya and Egypt—continued to work at cross-purposes. In the divided house of Islam it was a year of conferences and counter-conferences.

PROBLEMS OF MUSLIM DIPLOMACY

The Jidda-based Islamic Conference Organization (ICO) spent 1983 in the shadows, thwarted by sharp political disagreements among its member-states. The most serious of these was the continuing Iraqi-Iranian war, a bloodletting between two member-states which had defied the mediation attempts of the ICO Secretary-General, Habib Chatti, as it had all others. Another source of embarrassment was the ICO membership's failure to meet their commitments to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)—an ICO member at war with not only Israel, but with dissidents from within who enjoyed the support of some ICO member-states (see essay on the PLO). The fragile Muslim consensus, fashioned so skilfully by Chatti early in his tenure of office, was in disarray, upset by turbulent centrifugal forces operating in the Muslim world.

The period under survey (October 1982-October 1983) also represented a political hiatus since it fell between the ICO's annual Foreign Ministers' conferences. The Niamey Foreign Ministers' conference of August 1982 (see *Middle East Contemporary Survey [MECS]* 1981-82, pp. 300-1) and the Dacca Foreign Ministers' conference, scheduled for December 1983, were separated by over fifteen months, the longest interregnum between two such conferences since the establishment of the ICO.

THE POLITICAL IMPASSE

The ICO's mediation committee to halt the Iraqi-Iranian war entered its third year, and began to lose its temporary character. (For the history of the ICO mediation, see *MECS* 1980-81, pp. 125-27; 1981-82, pp. 283-84, 298-9.) The pattern was now firmly established: the mediators would convene in Jidda or some other city, and agree to send a delegation to Baghdad and Tehran; the delegation would report that hard-pressed Iraq had accepted the ICO's plan, but that Iran insisted upon stiffer terms; then would follow the announcement of deadlock and adjournment. This process was repeated in October 1982 and March 1983, with only a slightly revised peace plan.¹ These rounds of talks were fruitless since Iran was not yet exhausted and still hoped to achieve its final aim of toppling the Iraqi regime. (On the positions of the warring states, see essay on Iraqi-Iranian war.) Chatti had probably lost his last illusions about Iran's position, but he must have figured that if he sustained his mediation throughout the most difficult phase then Iran would turn to the ICO once it needed peace more than victory.

The problems of the PLO, Jerusalem and Palestine also defied Chatti's efforts.

ICO member-states which had resolved in 1981 to support a *jihād* to liberate Palestine failed in the following year even to muster a quorum for an emergency summit conference requested by the besieged PLO from Beirut. (On the ICO and the Beirut siege, see *MECS* 1981-82, p. 299.) Credibility on the central issue on the ICO's political agenda had been eroded. The ICO's Jerusalem Committee, under the chairmanship of Morocco's King Hasan, met in regular session from 21-22 January 1983 in the presence of the PLO Chairman, Yāsir 'Arafāt.² On this occasion, Chattī promised that the ICO would aid the PLO politically, economically and, 'if need be, with military and combat means. We in the ICO are about to form a military bureau to assess ways in which the Islamic nation could help the Palestinian revolution in the military sphere.'³ (The idea of a military bureau had drifted from working paper to working paper, until the events of Lebanon jolted the ICO member-states to promise its establishment during the Niamey Foreign Ministers' conference. On the history of the military bureau proposal, see *MECS* 1980-81, pp. 125, 129; 1981-82, p. 300.) By August 1983, the military bureau appeared on the ICO's own organizational chart (see Table 1). This escalation of support for the PLO to a military level was the ICO's act of repentance for failing to answer the PLO's pleas during the Beirut siege. But nothing was known about the planned functions of the new bureau.

Chattī complained more than once that his task was made impossible by Arab disagreements over a course of action on Palestine and Lebanon. In a frank interview he explained the role he thought the ICO should play in the Palestine issue. The organization's aim was to line up non-Arab Muslim support for what was essentially an Arab cause; but when the Arabs could not agree among themselves, little could be done:

The ICO has just started down its road. Islamic activity cannot yield positive results without Arab assistance, or as long as the Arabs are at loggerheads with one another. But when we all meet together to raise the question of Jerusalem's liberation, and want to take a decision on the matter, we discover that the Arab position is not unified.⁴

Commentators often contrast the decline of the Arab League with the rise of the ICO, but Chattī had apparently come to believe that the ICO was also facing troubled times if the Arabs themselves did not resolve their own differences.

The ICO secretariat showed no real initiative on other political issues. Chattī recorded the fate of an ICO committee established at the Tā'if Islamic summit conference to deal with the issue of Eritrean resistance (see *MECS* 1980-81, p. 130). The committee (composed of Senegal, Guinea and the ICO secretariat) met several times, but Ethiopia would have nothing to do with it. Chattī commented that because the ICO had taken the initiative:

Our relations with the Organization of African Unity [OAU] became absolutely worthless, because the OAU and, particularly, its Secretary-General, out of fear of the Ethiopian reaction, boycotted the ICO completely and refused to deal with it in any way.

Chattī decided to disengage the ICO, lest 'we cause problems between Arab and African states'.⁵ Chattī once again met the Philippines' President, Ferdinand Marcos, in March 1983 in an effort to resolve the conflict between Manila and the Muslim Moro National Liberation Front. (On Chattī's previous mediation at-

tempt, see *MECS* 1981-82, p. 298.) No progress was achieved, but Marcos asked Chatti to continue his efforts.⁶

Chatti's own travels were no substitute for periodic conference diplomacy; as 1982 drew to a close, major ICO conferences loomed on the near horizon. Chatti went to Morocco in September 1983 to plan a structured round of diplomacy culminating in an Islamic summit conference in Casablanca in January 1984. Chatti did not reveal what strategy had been devised with King Hasan to demonstrate Muslim solidarity.⁷

With the ICO at a political impasse, attention shifted for the time being to the organization's economic, scientific, and cultural activities. Muslim conferences were sponsored on issues as diverse as scientific co-operation, joint industrial ventures, forestry and Islamic art. This systematic work yielded tangible results; it also led to the creation of a bureaucratic network of specialized committees, subsidiary organs and affiliated institutions (see Table 1). Activities in these fields were not impeded by political divisions which hampered the work of the ICO secretariat. One of the most notable examples of a non-political initiative was the Jidda-based Islamic Development Bank (IDB). Since commencing operations in 1975, it had participated in 304 transactions involving \$2.8 bn.⁸ These forms of co-operation were, arguably, the cement which held the ICO together.

THE ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE ACADEMY

The ICO had in the past generally steered clear of narrowly religious issues, having been established by Governments as a temporal instrument of co-operation among States. The ICO articulated Islam as a political cause, not as a religious creed. But for Saudi Arabia—the ICO's host and principal sponsor—all issues were reducible in one way or another to religious issues, and religious consensus was as important as political agreement among Muslims. Saudi Arabia sought to impress this view upon other ICO members.

The constituent conference of the Islamic Jurisprudence Academy (*majma' al-fiqh al-islāmī*), was held at Mecca from 7-10 June 1983. Formally, the new Academy was an ICO subsidiary; its creation had been recommended and approved by ICO meetings.⁹ However, the Saudis took the exclusive lead in the Academy's formation, pressing the ICO to a decision and offering the Academy a permanent home in Jidda. The Academy's aim, as envisaged by King Fahd in his opening address to the conference, would be 'to unify all laws in Muslim countries in all affairs of life on the basis of Islamic law [*sharī'a*]'. The Academy would 'find a genuine Islamic answer to every question posed by the challenges of contemporary life . . . This requires mustering the efforts of the *'ulamā*, scholars and thinkers in the Islamic world'.¹⁰ In short, the Academy would serve as the Faith's highest legal authority, empowered to pass judgement on all matters of religious law, and so define the parameters of orthodox consensus. The establishment of the Academy represented an attempt to centralize the hitherto diffuse authority exercised by *'ulamā* in their own jurisdiction—an ambitious initiative without precedent.

King Fahd's opening address set guidelines for the spirit in which the Academy was to rule on pressing questions. Islam, he maintained, 'accepts modern accomplishments and urges their pursuit'. Islamic law 'responds to the needs of the time'. The Academy would expound this responsive Islam by exercising independent judgement (*ijtihād*) 'after thorough research and study in old and new jurisprudence'.¹¹ This, then, was to be an instrument for the reformation of Islamic law along modern lines.

The constituent conference was attended by ministerial delegations from thirty-nine ICO member-states, who agreed that each state would name one member to the council (*majlis*) of the Academy. Attached to the Academy would be five offices: planning, research, legal opinions (*iftā*), reconciliation between schools of law (*taqrīb bayna al-madhāhib*), and publishing.¹² The first session of the new Academy would be convened within five months, at a time determined by the ICO secretariat.¹³

While the centralization of jurisprudence under ICO and Saudi auspices would enhance the Kingdom's claim to primacy in Islam, it also carried the seeds of potential conflict. Indeed, the establishment of the Academy drew an immediate hostile response from the organ of Iran's ruling Islamic Republic Party, which called it 'an underhand plot' by Saudi rulers 'for disfiguring Islam and distorting it upon the endorsement of an assembly of people who are strangers to Islam'. Iran was certain that 'the Muslim masses throughout the world are sophisticated enough not to be duped' by this attempt 'to discredit the Islamic revolution in Iran and try to misrepresent it before the eyes of the world'.¹⁴ Other governments which did send delegations also had reason to be wary of the Academy's deliberations, particularly those which did not incorporate the *shari'a* in their legal systems. Nor was it certain that the Academy enjoyed the unequivocal support of leading conservative Saudi 'ulamā. Many of them took a dim view of religious innovation at the hands of others.¹⁵ But King Fahd was careful not to stir opposition in his address to the constituent conference and avoided any mention of specific matters on which the Academy would rule.

IRAN'S MUSLIM MESSAGE

Iran's dispute with its Muslim rivals, foremost among them Saudi Arabia, had reached an annual climax during the pilgrimage of 1982 (see *MECS* 1981-82, pp. 301-3). In promoting an activist, politicized pilgrimage, Iran claimed the sole authority to speak on behalf of authentic Islam. At issue was how Iran would spread its message of revolutionary Islam during the remaining eleven months of the year. The Saudi authorities had no intention of allowing the more vocal Iranian pilgrims to linger in the holy cities after the end of the pilgrimage. Khomeyni's official representative and supervisor of Iran's pilgrims, Hujjat al-Islam Musavi-Kho'iniha, did attempt to continue his activist work after the 1982 *hajj* had ended, proceeding from Mecca to Medina. There, on the night of 7-8 October 1982, he attempted to turn a prayer-meeting of several thousand Iranian pilgrims into a political demonstration. Saudi security authorities descended upon the crowd, and arrested Kho'iniha and seventy other 'instigators'. Once the pilgrim season was over, Saudi authorities felt no moral compulsion to tolerate the presence of 'tendentious elements'. They were immediately deported, thus bringing Kho'iniha's turbulent month in the holy cities to an anti-climatic conclusion.¹⁶

Ayatollah Husayn 'Ali Montazeri, Khomeyni's second and Kho'iniha's mentor, immediately appealed to 'ulamā everywhere for a 'council of representatives of Islamic nations and countries to be appointed to administer the two holy sanctuaries'. British colonialists had put 'an illiterate, hireling Bedouin in power' in Arabia; now, his 'discredited family who are unfamiliar with Islam', controlled the holy cities. 'I beg the Almighty . . . for the deliverance and liberation of the sacred places and of Islamic lands from the claws of Satan'.¹⁷ But gathering support for such a council was beyond Iran's ability; it had none of the institutions which the Saudis had created over the years to support a complex network of Muslim influence. The Iranian leadership acknowledged that their early efforts in this field had been inadequate (see *MECS* 1981-82, pp. 288-91). Therefore, one of its princi-

pal aims was to organize a forum in which other Muslims could express support for the aims of the Islamic revolution. It was no longer sufficient for 'aware Muslims' to meet during the limited season of the pilgrimage under the scrutiny of hostile authorities. Iran desired a more structured forum where Muslim sympathizers with its revolutionary aspirations could voice their enthusiasm in open deliberations and formal resolutions.

PRAYER LEADERS IN TEHRAN

Ayatollah Montazeri built upon foundations laid during 1982. In January 1982, he had marked the Prophet Muḥammad's birthday by declaring a week of Shī'i-Sunnī unity, and had convened a small conference in Tehran of foreign Muslims. (On the first unity week and conference, see *MECS* 1981-82, p. 290.) This time, the Iranian authorities organized the gathering more carefully. The Second World Congress of Friday *Imāms* and Prayer Leaders met in Tehran from 28 December to 2 January 1983. It is the traditional role of the Friday *imām*, in leading a mosque's largest weekly congregation, to deliver a *khutba* (sermon). The Friday sermon has often served as an instrument of Muslim oppositional expression in countries where other forms of mass meeting and public speaking are prohibited. It was Montazeri's aim to organize support for Iran's message among religious functionaries who came in weekly contact with large numbers of believers.

Invitations issued in Montazeri's name were sent to at least 300 selected Muslim prayer leaders throughout the world, and c. 130 responded. A congress organizer explained that not all of those invited were allowed by their governments to attend, otherwise the response would have been larger.¹⁸ Most of the named participants appeared to belong to the lower echelon of the religious hierarchies in their respective countries, but their relative obscurity was presented as evidence of the populist appeal of Iran's message; and the turnout established that Iran had built a rudimentary network of Muslim influence. Montazeri's invitations were diverse enough to give an impression of some geographic comprehensiveness; but since no list of foreign delegates was published, it was impossible to determine the extent of Sunnī participation.

The principal themes of the congress were the inseparable nature of religion and politics, and the need for Shī'i-Sunnī unity. These points were reiterated by the leading Iranian clerics who addressed the delegates or who received the foreign delegations—among them, Khomeyni, Montazeri, and Khameneh'i.¹⁹ As in 1982, the speeches reported at length in the media were delivered by Iranians. Some of the visitors granted press interviews, in which they hailed Khomeyni as leader of all the Muslims, praised the achievements of Islamic Iran, and justified Iran's war against the unbeliever, Saddām Husayn. The general mood was evoked by an Indonesian participant who declared that, 'without exaggeration, the moment I entered Iran, I felt myself to be in paradise'.²⁰

The final resolutions, which were signed by all of the participants, called upon Friday *imāms* and prayer leaders everywhere to speak of 'regional and international issues' in their sermons, and to emphasize the indivisibility of religion and politics. The mosques should not be mere places of prayer, but centres of political, cultural and military activity, as in the time of the Prophet Muḥammad. To achieve these aims, the World Congress of Friday *Imāms* and Prayer Leaders would become a permanent organization, with a secretariat in Tehran and branches in other Muslim countries. The secretariat would organize future world congresses, which would meet annually in Iran. The participants endorsed Montazeri's demand that the holy cities be administered by an international Islamic committee.²¹

The Tehran secretariat soon found its first cause to champion. A protracted

dispute over control of the Washington Islamic Centre reached a climax in 1983. This centre, under a governing board consisting of ambassadors from Muslim states, served an important diplomatic and professional community. Set in one of Washington's finer neighbourhoods, the richly-appointed mosque was a show-piece.²² Difficulties had begun in 1980 when a group of Iranians and other Muslim supporters of the Iranian revolution attempted to politicize the mosque's functions. In 1982 the American leader of the pro-Iranian group, Muḥammad al-Assi, succeeded through aggressive self-assertion in imposing himself as unauthorized *imām* at the centre. The governing board, anxious to avoid a confrontation, entered into a series of desultory negotiations with the group. Then, in March 1983, the governing board had a private security service evict the unauthorized *imām* from the premises and closed the centre, ostensibly for repairs. Muḥammad al-Assi immediately appealed to the Congress of Friday *Imāms* and Prayer Leaders for support in the dispute.²³

The governing board reopened the centre for the celebration of 'Īd al-Fitr on 11 July 1983 in the presence of 1,000 worshippers and several Muslim ambassadors. Members of the pro-Iranian group also attended, and a shouting match between the factions developed into a scuffle. The centre's director then invited the police into the mosque, where they arrested fifty-two persons who were charged with unlawful entry and disrupting a religious service.²⁴ On the Friday immediately following 'Īd al-Fitr, 120 members of the dissident *imām*'s group were turned away from the mosque and conducted their own prayer service on the sidewalk. 'The American system is co-operating with the tyrannies of the Middle East to repress us in this country', charged Muḥammad al-Assi.²⁵ The Iranian media gave sympathetic coverage to the group's struggle against 'the fascist US police' and 'the ambassadors of reactionary Arab countries'.²⁶

The World Congress of Friday *Imāms* and Prayer Leaders represented Iran's first effort at emulating the idea of a Muslim conference, which is relied upon so heavily by its rivals to bolster their claims to Muslim primacy. The move reflected the awareness within Iran's hierarchy that Islamic revolution would not spread by spontaneous emulation: a guiding hand and active Iranian support were essential. This new interest in the conference method also found expression in February 1983 on the occasion of the fourth anniversary of the Islamic revolution. During the previous year, Iran had dispatched 'Islamic information missions' headed by clerics to other Muslim countries (see *MECS* 1981-82, p. 291). For the fourth anniversary, Iran sponsored what was publicized as the First Conference on Islamic Thought, held in Tehran from 6-8 February 1983.²⁷ The conference was attended by 400 guests who had arrived for the anniversary celebrations from other Muslim countries. Its themes did not differ from those expounded at the World Congress of Friday *Imāms* and Prayer Leaders.²⁸

EXPORTING THE REVOLUTION

Iran's President Khameneh'i claimed that:

It is slanderous to describe the revolution in Iran as a sectarian revolution. Our revolution is the revolution of all Muslims, including Sunnis and Shi'is.²⁹

But Iran found it easiest to establish functional ties with Shi'i communities abroad. Following the revolution, Iran had reached out to the Shi'i communities in Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain but, in each case, their regimes had taken effective

counter-measures. Checked for the time being in the Gulf, Iran began to intensify its activities among three other Shī'ī communities.

In the autumn of 1982, Iran took an unprecedented step in disseminating the message of the revolution by dispatching Iranian volunteers to Lebanon's Biqā' Valley. The sending of Iranians to take part in the battle against Israel had been a subject of discussion in Tehran ever since the revolution, and Ayatollah Montazeri had urged the move as early as 1979.³⁰ The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in the summer of 1982 gave new life to the proposal; by late December 1982, c. 1,500 Iranians were assembled in Ba'albak and its vicinity.

The influx of Iranian volunteers coincided with a major split in Lebanese Shī'ī ranks, which worked to Iran's advantage. The established Lebanese Shī'ī leadership had been wary of too close an association with Iran, and resisted submission to the politico-spiritual authority of Khomeyni. The Iranian Ambassador to Lebanon, Musa Fakhr-Ruhani—one of whose tasks it was to make Lebanese Shī'īs adherents of the revolution—was wont to complain of the obstructionism of Lebanese Shī'ī leaders, among them Shaykh 'Abd al-Amīr Qabalān, Shaykh Muḥammad Mahdī Shams al-Dīn, and the leader of the *Amal* militia, Nabīh Barrī.³¹ (For their roles, see chapter on Lebanon.) But in July 1982, an *Amal* commander, Husayn al-Mūsawī, broke away to form his own faction, denouncing the established leadership for 'collaborating' with the US and Israel. Along with 5,000 of his followers in the Biqā' Valley, Mūsawī put himself at Iran's disposal. The Iranian volunteers and Mūsawī's faction together transformed Ba'albak into a revolutionary Shī'ī stronghold, plastered with portraits of Khomeyni and bedecked with Iranian flags, from where they waged war against the Lebanese central government and its allies. (On the suicide bombings attributed to them, see chapter on Lebanon.) A linkage with Lebanese Shī'īs had finally been achieved. Iran's apparent aim was to block any Lebanese settlement beneficial to what it regarded as the enemies of Islam—the US, Israel and President Amin Jumayyil—and to establish itself as defender of Lebanese Shī'ī interests.

The support given by various Muslim states and organizations to Afghan resistance groups had made Afghanistan yet another arena of competition for Muslim primacy. Support for the Peshawar-based groups had come principally from the Arab states of the Gulf, on the one hand, and the Muslim Brotherhood through the Pakistani *Jama'ate Islami*, on the other. Iran had not offered assistance on a comparable scale to any group.³² Now, Iran deepened its involvement by supplying two Afghan Shī'ī resistance groups with money and arms. Both groups were licensed to raise funds in Iran for the *jihād*, and maintained offices in Iranian cities. The faster-growing of the two, *Sazmane Nasr* ('Organization for Victory') operated throughout the central region of Hazarajat. With extensive Iranian aid, it was also able to establish itself in the Salang Valley in March 1983, where it was in a better position to intercept Soviet military convoys.³³ Iran apparently intended to compete with its Arab rivals in patronizing the *jihād*, and to enhance the standing of the Afghan Shī'ī minority in the resistance.³⁴

Violent street battles between Shī'īs and Sunnīs erupted in Karachi, Pakistan, from 21-22 February, 18-19 March, and 12-13 April 1983. Each outbreak resulted in fatalities, arson damage, and hundreds of arrests. The dispute arose ostensibly over whether a piece of property would be used for the construction of a Shī'ī shrine (*imambarah*) or a Sunnī mosque.³⁵ Such sectarian conflict had its own inner dynamism, but was exacerbated by a new Shī'ī assertiveness following the Iranian revolution.

The question of Iranian official involvement came to a head in March 1983.

Film shot by Pakistani government agents showed the Iranian Consul-General in Karachi delivering inflammatory speeches in Shī'ī mosques, and exhorting crowds in the streets. Police also linked the Consul-General with ten Iranian students who were arrested in February for bombing French-owned installations. (For Iranian attitudes towards France at that time, see chapter on Iran.) The evidence led Pakistani authorities to expel the Iranian official in March.³⁶

Relations between Iran and Pakistan were generally correct, and once the violence began Iran did not fan the flames. The Iranian media maintained that the outbreak of sectarian strife was part of an intrigue by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Mossad, and Saudi agents to divide the Muslims and isolate the Iranian revolution.³⁷ Immediately following the April disturbances, the Iranian Ambassador to Pakistan visited Karachi and distributed a *fatwā* by Khomeyni on the need for Shī'ī-Sunnī unity.³⁸ But the Secretary-General of the *Jama'ate Islami*—Pakistan's foremost fundamentalist and predominantly Sunnī party—charged that Iran had followed 'a sectarian approach in its political affairs . . . Now their relations with us are not very warm'. He continued: 'Their delegations come to Pakistan and first go to the Shī'ī community which, in general, was pro-Shah'.³⁹ Whatever the validity of the various charges, it was clear that certain Iranian officials had encouraged a minority Shī'ī community to tread a path which had alienated Pakistan's most powerful fundamentalist association.

Several instances of Iranian involvement with Sunnī Muslim fundamentalists also came to light, involving various fringe groups:

- Delegations from three Malaysian Muslim groups visited Iran in January 1983, perhaps in connection with the World Congress of Friday *Imāms* and Prayer Leaders (see above). Malaysian intelligence sources later reported that one of the groups, the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party, had agreed with Iranian officials to plan an Islamic revolution in Malaysia.⁴⁰
- In March 1983, Istanbul martial law authorities charged thirty-three persons with conspiring to establish an Islamic State in Turkey. According to Turkish sources, the activities of the accused had been co-ordinated with the Iranian Consulate in Istanbul.⁴¹
- In August 1983, severe sentences were handed down by a Sarajevo court against twelve Yugoslav Muslims convicted of conspiring to establish an Islamic republic in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Five of the group—though not its leader—had visited Iran in December 1982. The prosecution alleged that they went secretly in order to seek aid for their plan; the accused claimed that they went only to witness the implementation of an Islamic order, although they admitted that the Iranian authorities did pay for their trip.⁴²
- In September 1983, security police in Trinidad, whose Muslim minority comprise 10% of the island's population, claimed to have uncovered a conspiracy by a sect of Black Muslims to overthrow the government. A police spokesman said that support for the group had been channelled through the Iranian embassy in the Venezuelan capital of Caracas. Embassy personnel had been observed visiting the sect's headquarters in Port of Spain. He added: 'We believe the intention is to seize the Government and set up a fundamentalist Muslim regime such as the one in Iran'.⁴³

Reports also continued to circulate that Iran had established a school, or special programme, for students from abroad. These cadres, imbued with revolutionary Muslim ideals, were expected after completing their studies to disseminate the doctrine that politics and religion were inseparable. Their ultimate aim would

be the establishment of revolutionary Muslim regimes in their own countries. The latest account of this programme—which was said to be secret—placed the school in Qom, under the supervision of Kho'iniha. The course is said to include both religious studies and commando training, and to enjoy the patronage of Ayatollah Montazeri, who receives the students personally every few weeks. The participants in the programme include nationals of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Morocco, Nigeria, and Afghanistan.⁴ But there were no signs of co-operation between Iran and the major Sunni fundamentalist organizations, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamic Liberation Party, and the *Jama'ate Islami*. (On the origins of the estrangement, see *MECS* 1981-82, p. 292.)

THE POWER OF ISLAM

Iran's efforts were not restricted entirely to propaganda and subversion. There were Muslim states with whom Iran enjoyed cordial and close relations, and proposals were made about the means to give these relations some Islamic content. In early 1982, a number of Iranian Cabinet Ministers and the media began to speak of the creation of an Islamic common market, with the aim of freeing the economies of Muslim states from servitude to foreign interests. (On the proposals, see *MECS* 1981-82, p. 291.) This subject was subsequently studied by a high-level committee organized by the Ministry of Commerce. It was composed of representatives of interested government offices and state-run concerns. The detailed report which the committee issued treated both the theoretical advantages and practical obstacles to such a plan.⁵

Most of the participants in the discussions opposed the immediate creation of an Islamic common market because Muslim countries were too divided, politically and economically. Were Iran to launch such an appeal it would certainly fail, given the inevitable opposition of a number of Muslim countries to an Iranian-sponsored initiative. As an interim measure, it was proposed that Iran should develop close economic ties with six countries: Algeria, Bangladesh, Libya, Pakistan, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDY) and Syria. The report did not discount efforts within the framework of the ICO, and urged Iran to play a greater role in its institutions. But while the ICO's plans for Muslim economic co-operation revolved around Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, these new proposals centred upon Iran and its political allies.

The eventual benefits that Iran could expect to reap from the strengthening of political and economic ties among Muslim countries and the creation of more Islamic republics were outlined by Khomeyni. He claimed that with unity of purpose:

Governments of Islamic countries with the support of their people can set up a common and joint defensive army that is more than 100m strong and trained, and can have in reserve more millions to become the greatest power in the world.

Even an army of ten million would dwarf those of the existing powers. Khomeyni called upon Muslim states to study this suggestion.⁶ It was this vision of restored power which drove Iran to organize, preach and, perhaps, conspire in the name of a universal Islam. Unity and power were the Muslim messages borne, once again, by Iranian pilgrims to Mecca. (On the pilgrimage of 1983, see below.)

MUSLIM COUNTER-CONFERENCE IN BAGHDAD

The Iraqi regime did not idly view Iranian attempts to organize wider Muslim

support for its purposes. To prove that Muslim support existed for Iraqi objectives, leading Iraqi *'ulamā* convened a Popular Islamic Conference (*al-mu'tamar al-sha'bi al-islāmī*) in Baghdad, from 14-17 April 1983. Shaykh 'Alī Kāshif al-Ghitā, the leading supporter of the regime among Iraq's Shi'i clerics, presided over the conference. On a previous occasion, he had issued a *fatwā* from Najaf condemning Khomeyni as a heretic. The conference was reported to have been attended by 280 *'ulamā* and lay activists from fifty countries. They must have known in advance that their task would be to endorse Iraq's demands for an immediate ceasefire and an Iranian withdrawal.

The organizers relied to a large extent upon the Saudi network of Muslim affiliations in mobilizing participants since Iraq had done little to cultivate such ties in the past. The principal figure behind the scenes was Ma'rūf al-Dawālibī, a former Syrian Prime Minister with a forty-year history of Muslim activism behind him. Dawālibī now resides in Riyadh, where he had served as a royal adviser to Kings Khālid and Fahd. In recent years, Dawālibī has become an informal Saudi ambassador to Muslim associations and societies abroad, and presides over the Karachi-based World Muslim Congress and a Geneva-based society known as 'Islam and the West'. Also noteworthy was the presence of a sizeable Egyptian delegation, which included a Deputy Minister, a member of Egypt's parliament, and a personal representative of Shaykh al-Azhar Jādd al-Ḥaqq 'Alī Jādd al-Ḥaqq. Leading Iraqi *'ulamā* had turned earlier to the Shaykh al-Azhar with a request that he invoke his religious authority to forbid the continuing bloodshed.⁴⁷ The standing of the other delegations varied widely. In his speech to the conference, President Saddām Ḥusayn declared that:

When we sensed that the Muslims wanted us to withdraw from Iranian territory . . . we responded to Muslim opinion, to world public opinion and to Iranian public opinion, and withdrew to the borders.

Now it was the turn of Iran to heed Muslim opinion.

We do not think that the Muslims now convening in Baghdad, or Muslims in other places, would like to see Iraq insecure. Iraq wants to defend its international borders . . . Iraq wants a ceasefire. Iraq wants peace. When these are the declared and undeclared goals of Iraq, I do not think any Muslim, here or elsewhere, can be against them.⁴⁸

The conference participants, however, did not simply endorse Iraq's position, but sought to mediate between the warring states. After it had been convened, the conference sent a request to Khomeyni that Iran send a delegation; this appeal went unanswered.⁴⁹ In their final resolutions, the conferees endorsed the Iraqi demand for an immediate ceasefire and an Iranian withdrawal to the international border; but they also established a nine-man mediation committee led by Dawālibī.⁵⁰ Dawālibī then appealed to the Iranian Chargé d'Affaires in Baghdad for the mediation committee to be received in Tehran. After three meetings between the committee and the Chargé, Tehran replied that the committee would not be received since the conference deliberations had been biased.⁵¹

Iraq's aim in promoting Muslim mediation outside the framework of the ICO remained obscure. But the failure of the attempt also served Iraqi ends. Since the conference resolutions had called for a political, cultural and economic boycott of either of the adversaries should it fail to heed the appeal of the committee, Iraq could now maintain that Iran stood outside the Muslim consensus. The event was

thus not without some value, however ephemeral, in the relentless war of words waged between Iran and Iraq in the idiom of Islam.

LIBYA'S UNPREDICTABLE ISLAM

Libya, too, made a clarion claim to Muslim primacy, directed principally against the religious pretensions of Saudi Arabia. Mu'ammār al-Qadhafī argued through most of 1982 that Saudi Arabia was an enemy of Islam, and that *jihād* was required to liberate Arabia's holy cities from Saudi control (see *MECS* 1981-82, pp. 293, 294 and essay on inter-Arab relations). During the pilgrimage of 1982, three Libyans were allegedly arrested on board a Libyan ship in Jidda port by Saudi authorities; Libya again demanded that the holy cities be placed under international Muslim administration.³

But, true to form, Qadhafī executed a political volte-face in early 1983 and sought a reconciliation with Saudi Arabia. (On this reversal, see essay on inter-Arab relations in this volume.) As a result, mutual charges of religious unbelief ceased, and no more Libyan calls were heard for the dismemberment of Saudi Arabia. But Libya did not cease to organize wider Muslim support for Qadhafī's vision of Islam. The Tripoli-based Islamic Call Society (*jam'iyyat al-da'wa al-islāmiyya*) was given the structure of an international Muslim organization in August 1982. The Society had established a world council (*majlis 'ālamī*) consisting of thirty-six members from various Muslim countries. They were to meet annually. (On the restructuring of the Islamic Call Society, see *MECS* 1981-82, p. 294.) The new world council's first annual meeting was held in Tripoli from 24-25 December 1982. The session simply reviewed the resolutions carried by the August 1982 general conference, and took no new initiatives. Nor did the members pronounce their views on the controversies surrounding Libyan policy towards other Muslim states.⁴ This was in marked contrast with Qadhafī's use of the general conference as a platform for an attack on the Saudi administration of the holy cities. But the world council provided a lever which Qadhafī could use in any future round of religious polemics.

Another aspect of the restructuring was the convening of regional meetings of the Islamic Call Society's missionaries. The first such gathering for Europe and the Americas met in Malta from 16-18 October 1982.⁵ By means of such meetings it would be possible to keep Libya's emissaries to important Muslim communities *au courant* with Qadhafī's shifts of policy. A similar gathering for South-east Asia and the Pacific met in Kuala Lumpur in early June 1983.⁶ The structure of this society—general conference, world council, and regional meetings—was patterned very closely on that of the Saudi-backed Muslim World League (*MWL*; *rābitat al-'ālam al-islāmī*; see below). Both organizations were represented in many of the same Muslim countries and communities throughout the world—but as rivals. They maintained no ties whatsoever, and each avoided all mention of the other's activities.

On the occasion of the Islamic Call Society's restructuring, accounts appeared which shed further light on its role. The society was endowed with a fund which allowed it to support Muslim associations, publish books, train and maintain missionaries. It also ran an institute for Muslim missionary studies, which granted a certificate in propagation of Islam supposedly equivalent to a Master's degree.⁷

Libya's involvement in Chad attracted attention to the rapid expansion of Libya's Islamic Legion, a military formation composed of Muslim volunteers from various countries. It was reported that the Islamic Legion consisted of 8,500 foreigners and 1,700 Libyans: among the former were 2,800 Sudanese, 1,250 Chadians, 500 Nigerians, 750 Egyptians, 500 Bangladeshis, and several hundred

Tunisians, Pakistanis, Indians and Palestinians. The corps was divided into para-trooper, armoured and mobile infantry brigades. Junior officers and non-commissioned officers had been promoted through the ranks, and only the high command was Libyan.⁵⁷

These were the instruments for disseminating ideas about an Islam coloured by Qadhdhāfi's eclectic ideas about socialism, popular democracy, Arabism and Africanism. It was difficult to determine how far the doctrine had spread beyond Libya. Yet, for the new Libya-sponsored gatherings and the expanding corps of Muslim volunteers, Qadhdhāfi was the touchstone of orthodoxy and the champion of Islam.

CUSTODIANS OF SAUDI ISLAM

The Saudi claim to represent authentic Islam continued to be reiterated in a systematic and subtle manner. In early 1982, ridicule of that claim by Libyan critics had driven Saudi religious authorities to employ the less dignified tactics of their rivals. The Saudi senior council of *'ulamā* had issued a proclamation denouncing Qadhdhāfi as an unbeliever (*kāfir*; see *MECS* 1981-82, p. 293). But with the easing of tensions and Qadhdhāfi's visit to Saudi Arabia in June 1983, the Saudis could return to the promotion of their religious pre-eminence *sotto voce*. (On the relaxation in Saudi-Libyan tension, see above and essay on inter-Arab relations.) The methodical expansion of the Saudi network of Muslim influence advanced apace.

Saudi views on Muslim issues continued to be disseminated far afield by the Mecca-based MWL. The first major event in the MWL's new season was the meeting at Brussels of the Continental Council of Mosques in Europe, from 7-9 November 1982. (On the MWL generally and on the council, see *MECS* 1981-82, pp. 295-97.) Shaykh Muḥammad 'Alī al-Ḥarakān, the MWL Secretary-General, presided. The numerous Saudi-supported mosques in the European Muslim diaspora had been disturbed by divisions which afflicted their congregations. The *imām* of the Brussels Centre Islamique—the co-ordinator of Saudi mosque support in Europe—allowed that 'some of our difficulties and problems are caused not by enemies of Islam, but by Muslims themselves, because of their differing understandings [of Islam] . . . I will not conceal from you that our Muslim world is today agitated by strife (*fitna*), both sectarian and political. The many disputes are reflected in our situation because the Muslim *émigré* community hails from a number of Arab and Islamic states'.⁵⁸ To thwart those opposed to the Saudi version elaborated by the Brussels *imām* and others, the Council approved the establishment of a committee of jurisprudence (*fiqh*) especially for the European Muslim diaspora. The aim was to defeat initiatives 'plotted' by adversaries who remained unnamed.⁵⁹ In June 1983, potential members of the committee were invited to Mecca for talks and screening.⁶⁰ Shaykh Ḥarakān also visited Switzerland and Great Britain, and there publicized various MWL grants for mosque construction and improvement.⁶¹

More dramatic was Shaykh Ḥarakān's tour through South-east Asia and the Far East. His first stop was Kuala Lumpur, where he met numerous mosque officials and promised aid.⁶² Next he attended the inauguration of the Continental Council of Mosques in Asia and the Pacific at a conference in Jakarta from 10-12 December 1982. The new Council, which received SR1m from the MWL to begin its operations, was meant to serve Shaykh Ḥarakān's broad purpose of organizing all Saudi-supported mosques under centralized auspices. Like the other continental councils, this one was a subsidiary of the MWL's Supreme World Council of Mosques in Mecca. The inauguration was co-ordinated with the Indonesian Minis-

try of Religion, and Shaykh Ḥarakān was received by President Suharto. On this occasion, Shaykh Ḥarakān pledged SR4m to Indonesian mosque development.⁶³ From Jakarta, he proceeded to Tokyo for the opening of the new Tokyo Mosque and Islamic Centre, constructed in large part with Saudi financial assistance. While in Tokyo, the MWL delegation announced a further contribution for completion of the edifice, and agreed to bear a portion of the operating expenses.⁶⁴ These tours exemplified the world-wide activism of Shaykh Ḥarakān. In his seven years as Secretary-General, he had emerged as the paramount co-ordinator of Saudi patronage for Muslim movements abroad.

While in Tokyo, Shaykh Ḥarakān suffered a heart attack and died in Jidda at the age of seventy. Funeral services for this pre-eminent Saudi missionary were conducted at the Great Mosque in Mecca.⁶⁵ During their annual meeting in Mecca in August 1983, members of the MWL's constituent council elected Dr 'Abdallāh al-Nasīf as the new Secretary-General. Unlike his predecessor, he was a layman, only forty-four years of age, with a doctorate in Geology and administrative experience in the King 'Abd al-'Azīz University in Riyadh.⁶⁶

The Saudi spotlight was thrown on another influential figure with the announcement of the winners of the Faysal Prize for Service to Islam—an annual reward reserved for great articulators of Faysal's Muslim vision. The winner receives a cash prize of SR300,000, a gold medal and a certificate listing his services to the faith. The prize in 1983 was split between Shaykh Ḥasanayn Makhlūf, an Egyptian with Saudi ties, and, more interestingly, the former ICO Secretary-General, and one-time Prime Minister of Malaysia, Tunku Abdul Rahman. Since leaving his Jidda post, he had set up *Perkim*, an organization for the propagation of Islam headquartered in Kuala Lumpur, which claimed to have made 160,000 converts among Chinese Malays. Saudi (and some Libyan) financial support had put *Perkim* in one of the city's most impressive buildings, a monument in concrete and marble to Saudi missionary efforts.⁶⁷

A member of the Saudi royal family continued his pursuit of predominance in the expanding field of Islamic banking. Prince Muḥammad al-Faysal Al Sa'ūd intensified his already energetic promotion of the \$1 bn Geneva-based investment company, Dar al-Maal al-Islami (DMI; on the birth of the DMI, see *MECS* 1981-82, p. 297.) In December 1982, Prince Muḥammad announced that the initial private and public offerings had raised \$310m from 14,500 shareholders, among them ten Heads of State.⁶⁸ In the same month, the first DMI-sponsored Islamic bank opened in Manāma, with a capital of \$20m.⁶⁹ Prince Muḥammad also negotiated with other Arab states to open additional banks. The DMI announced that permission would next be sought to open a bank, investment company, and insurance company in Karachi.⁷⁰ It was also reported that operating licences had been issued to the DMI in fourteen countries.⁷¹

Conferences, mosque councils, cash prizes, banks—these were some of the instruments used to promote Saudi religious influence. Their effect was cumulative and not measurable. The Saudis had earned and bought a great deal of Muslim influence in a rapid expansion of activity financed by Saudi Arabia's vast resources. How much of this institution-building was superfluous—the waste so common in other spheres of Saudi development—is difficult to say; but the Saudi network of Muslim influence functioned, and served as a constant reminder to all who might seek to displace it.

EGYPT'S LEAGUE EXPIRES, BUT AL-AZHAR LIVES

Cairo had been the seat of a League of Islamic and Arab Peoples since October 1980. It was established to mitigate the effects of Egypt's suspension from the ICO

after the signing of the peace accord with Israel (see *MECS* 1978-79, pp. 223-24). As the new league won little Muslim support abroad, it soon became a symbol of Egypt's isolation. Not long after his accession, President Ḥusnī Mubārak withdrew the presidential patronage which his predecessor had extended to the league. (On the emergence and decline of the league, see *MECS* 1980-81, pp. 122, 135-36, 262-64; 1981-82, p. 295.) In February 1983, Mubārak took the final step by abrogating the presidential decree which had initially established the organization. The league, it was explained, had been created to meet temporary aims; Egypt never intended that it should replace existing Islamic and Arab organizations. Since a new situation now prevailed in Egypt's relations with Islamic and Arab states, the league no longer served any useful purpose.⁷² The abrogation eliminated an obvious obstacle to any further initiative for Egypt's restoration to the ICO fold.

This step also provided an occasion for convening the ninth congress of the Academy of Islamic Research (*majma' al-buḥūth al-islāmiyya*), from 18-24 March 1983.⁷³ The original purpose of the academy, an Azhar institution established by the reform law of 1961, was to bring together Muslim theologians and thinkers from Egypt and abroad. The academy's international congresses met frequently in the early years to provide Islamic justification for socialism, and to declare the battle against Israel a religious obligation. But some of the academy's members were not prepared to endorse Anwar al-Sādāt's foreign and domestic policy reversals which, they believed, diminished Egypt's stature in the Muslim world. A congress had not been convened since October 1977, and the academy had lost much of its funding.⁷⁴ The reconvening of the congress signalled the academy's rehabilitation, made possible by Mubārak's readjustments of policy. The congress resolutions, *inter alia*, called upon Muslim peoples and governments 'to act with every means to restore a united Jerusalem to Arab and Islamic sovereignty'.⁷⁵

At the same time, the religious establishment reiterated al-Azhar's claim to elucidate and define authentic Islam. Extensive celebrations were held in March 1983 to mark a millenium of religious instruction at the mosque-university.⁷⁶ The commemorative events were attended by 250 carefully selected Muslim 'ulamā and activists from abroad.⁷⁷ Addressing the celebrants, Mubārak hailed the role of al-Azhar in construing Islam as a religion of tolerance, and called upon Muslims everywhere to set aside their differences.⁷⁸

Many of the speakers at the various gatherings sought to emphasize the continuing influence of al-Azhar upon the development of Muslim thought in the wider Muslim world. Al-Azhar still attracted foreign students interested in higher religious studies; in the 1982-83 academic year, 1,883 foreign Muslims resided in the dormitory city (*madīnat al-bu'ūth*) especially provided for them.⁷⁹ Al-Azhar's faculties of theology also continued to train Egyptian 'ulamā for service in other Muslim countries and in the Muslim diaspora; 1,200 of these emissaries were reported to be working abroad.⁸⁰ Yet, the deliberations of the Academy of Islamic Research and the celebration served as reminders that Egypt's influence in the wider Muslim world had waned. Neither event drew the amount of interest due to such an important institution. In matters of religious guidance, the newer Saudi theological academies had superseded the Egyptian one, and many foreign students who might once have attended al-Azhar preferred the newer Saudi institutions. At the same time, Egyptian influence in mosques and Islamic centres abroad was steadily eroded—usually by Saudi and Libyan financially-supported efforts.⁸¹ Given Egypt's difficulties in providing adequate religious guidance for its own people, al-Azhar's capacity to compete for influence in the wider Muslim world was much diminished.

CHANGING GUARD IN SOVIET ISLAM

For three decades, the principal spokesman for official Soviet Islam in the wider Muslim world had been Mufti Ziauddin Babakhanov, Chairman of the Muslim Religious Board of Central Asia and Kazakhstan at Tashkent. It had been his task, made difficult by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, to portray the Soviet Union as the great ally of Muslim peoples in their struggle against Imperialism. (For account of the Tashkent Muslim conference under his auspices, see *MECS* 1980-81, pp. 121-22.) In October 1982, together with leading Soviet Muslim '*ulamā*', he issued a condemnation of the Afghan resistance forces, described as 'terrorist bands sent into Afghanistan from outside' who were 'in reality tools in the hands of imperialist forces under the dominance of the US'. The appeal urged all Muslims to unite 'against the efforts of international Imperialism and stop its interference in the affairs of Muslim nations, including the affairs of democratic Afghanistan'.⁸² The indefatigable *mufī* died in December 1982 at the age of 74, and was succeeded in his various capacities by his son, Shamsuddin Babakhanov.

THE PILGRIMAGE OF 1983

The approach of the pilgrimage gave rise to Saudi apprehension well before the season began. The previous two years had seen repeated clashes between Saudi police and Iranian pilgrims, resulting in arrests and deportations (see *MECS* 1981-82; pp. 284-88, 301-3). In the absence of a reconciliation with Iran, it seemed probable that Iranian pilgrims would again work to politicize the pilgrimage. It was impossible for Saudi Arabia to bar Iran's pilgrims as pilgrimage was a fundamental religious duty; any step to exclude Iranians would have provoked widespread Muslim disapproval. Instead, Saudi officials put obstacles in the way of Iran's pilgrimage. Although Saudi authorities denied conducting an obstructionist policy, there were real delays in making provisions for Iranian pilgrims. This gave rise to considerable Iranian concern since the Iranian Government bore the responsibility for arranging housing, transportation and medical care for its own nationals; if it failed to make those arrangements well in advance, it incurred the risk of Iranians cancelling their pilgrimage plans. The reserving of accommodation was the most important of these preparations since housing in Mecca and Medina is usually scarce and expensive during the pilgrimage season. As early as June 1983, Iran's Islamic Guidance Minister, Hujjat al-Islam Muḥammad Khatami, complained that the 'ignorance and carelessness' of minor Saudi officials had led to a two-month delay in the assignment of housing.⁸³ This was the subject of a formal note of protest submitted by Iran to Saudi Arabia, which complained of a Saudi refusal to issue entry permits to Iranian officials responsible for making reservations.⁸⁴

An official Iranian delegation finally visited Saudi Arabia from 17-20 July 1983, and immediately encountered difficulties. The delegation complained to Saudi authorities about obstacles placed in the way of Iranians charged with securing housing. According to Hujjat al-Islam Musavi-Kho'iniha—again Khomeyni's pilgrimage supervisor—the Saudis made untenable demands:

They say our pilgrims must have no contact whatsoever with Saudi Arabian citizens . . . and in every house rented to Iranian pilgrims, one room should be set aside for Saudi security men.⁸⁵

The Iranian delegation returned home in a huff.⁸⁶ Khatami issued an open letter to Muslim states claiming that Saudi Arabia 'is trying barefacedly and by imagi-

nary excuses to prevent the impending journey of about 100,000 Iranian Muslims'.⁹ Ayatollah Montazeri was moved to appeal to '*ulamā* and Friday *imāms* everywhere. Had the Saudis 'thought about the political and social consequences of their blasphemous act?' They had 'demeaned the religious conscience as well as the Islamic sanctities of all the world's Muslims'.¹⁰

The Saudi Interior Minister, Nā'if Ibn 'Abd al-'Azīz—by now schooled in this genre of polemic—denied the charge of obstruction and listed the 'strange practices' of Iranian pilgrims in recent years. These included 'direct attacks against Saudi officials, condemnation of Saudi policies and incitements to combat every Islamic and Arab country which does not approve of the attitudes of the Iranian revolution'. Iranians had even entered the Grand Mosque in Mecca with hidden firearms, which had been found 'dozens of times'. How could Iran deny Saudi Arabia the right to preserve internal order while it committed 'oppressive actions and massacres every day against their citizens in Iran on the pretext of preserving security'?¹¹

At the same time, Saudi Arabia began to issue pilgrims' visas¹² and Khomeyni decided that the pilgrims would be sent despite the obstacles.¹³ Kho'iniha declared that Iranians 'are determined to carry out this religious duty even if they have to live in mosques or on the streets . . . As for us, we do not mind very much if we have several thousand revolutionary pilgrims, day in and day out, inside the Great Mosque'.¹⁴ This was meant to strike a chord, for residing in the mosques and streets was not permitted, both for reasons of security and sanitation. Iran finally did manage to reserve all the required accommodation. Now, another issue surfaced, concerning the number of Iranian pilgrims to be admitted. Saudi Arabia announced that it would receive 85,000,¹⁵ but Khomeyni spoke of 100,000, warning that 'Iran will send either all her pilgrims, or none of them'. If none went, Khomeyni predicted 'an explosion within Islam'.¹⁶ Ultimately, visas were issued to all who sought them.

Yet, despite the heavy verbal jousting which preceded the pilgrimage season, Iranian pilgrims and Saudi police did not clash as they had during the previous two seasons. The explanation lay in secret mediation conducted by Libya's leader, Mu'ammār al-Qadhafī, who was on excellent terms with Iran and who had improved his relations with Saudi Arabia. Only after the pilgrimage did Iran's Prime Minister reveal that 'a friendly third country' had presented recommendations concerning the pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia and Iran before the season.¹⁷ These served as the basis of an understanding, the details of which were not made public; but its general lines could be deduced from the course of the pilgrimage.

The understanding provided that there would be no hostile propaganda directed by the two States against one another during the pilgrimage. It may also have prohibited calls for mass marches, such as those issued by Kho'iniha during the previous season in both Medina and Mecca. These had been occasions for the most serious clashes in which there were injuries and arrests. At the same time, Saudi police were to show greater restraint and permit limited expositions of Iran's Muslim message in small meetings and demonstrations. Kho'iniha still hoped to secure Saudi acquiescence in one large march in Mecca against the US, the USSR, and Israel.¹⁸ But the first part of his stay in Medina passed uneventfully. 'The Iranian pilgrims are not here to confront you', Kho'iniha told Saudi officials on his arrival. 'Rather, our objective is to counter the American and Soviet superpowers, as well as Zionism'.¹⁹ While in Medina, Kho'iniha even spoke of 'extra courtesy' shown by Saudi officials to Iranian pilgrims.²⁰

In Mecca there was tension in the air. Saudi police were stationed in large numbers at Kho'iniha's headquarters, for it was there that the worst clash of the

THE DIVIDED HOUSE OF ISLAM

previous year had occurred.⁹⁹ To review their understanding, Kho'iniha met with the Saudi Pilgrimage and *Waqfs* Minister,¹⁰⁰ while the Iranian Chargé d'Affaires in Jidda met with the Saudi Foreign Minister.¹⁰¹ Iran's Islamic Guidance Minister, Khatami declared: 'Now that all the esteemed pilgrims have gathered at blessed Mecca, we are witnessing certain incidents which increase our doubts about the sincerity of Saudi Arabian officials'. They had given promises, 'more or less' about 'respecting the divine rights of the pilgrims'.¹⁰²


The understanding almost went to pieces a day later, on 13 September 1983, at Kho'iniha's headquarters in Mecca when a large crowd—Tehran spoke of 100,000—gathered to hear Kho'iniha speak on the Islamic revolution and the situations in Lebanon and Afghanistan.¹⁰³ When the crowd began to march—to chants of 'death to America, death to Russia, death to Israel, Muslims, unite, unite!'—the Saudi police acted. With water cannons and batons, they dampened the enthusiasm of the assembly, wounding twenty-five persons.¹⁰⁴ Qadhdhāfi expressed his 'great anger at such clashes which took place in contradiction to what had been agreed upon with Iran to avoid anything in the pilgrimage season that might disturb the serenity of the pilgrims'.¹⁰⁵ The Iranian Prime Minister denied that Iran had pledged not to organize such a demonstration.¹⁰⁶ In any event, there were no further incidents, and Kho'iniha remained in Saudi Arabia for the duration of the pilgrimage season.¹⁰⁷

Iran's decision to come to an understanding was probably a political one, reflecting an interest in undermining Saudi support for Iraq. But the decision was certainly made easier once Iran had organized other means to disseminate its revolutionary message. Throughout the pilgrimage, however, the Iranian media and those clerics who did not make the pilgrimage heaped abuse upon Saudi Arabia and its 'American Islam'. Even in the season of peace, they continued to ask the question posed by Khomeyni: 'How can those who engage in clear opposition to the Qur'ān call themselves an Islamic Government and be the custodians of Mecca?'¹⁰⁸

Martin Kramer

INTRA-REGIONAL AND MUSLIM AFFAIRS

TABLE 1: ISLAMIC CONFERENCE ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE



SPECIALIZED COMMITTEES:

1. Al-Quds Committee
2. Permanent Finance Committee
3. Islamic Commission for Economic, Cultural and Social Affairs
4. Standing Committee for Scientific and Technical Co-operation
5. Standing Committee for Economic and Trade Co-operation
6. Standing Committee for Information and Cultural Affairs

INSTITUTIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS WITHIN THE ICO SYSTEM

1. Islamic Development Bank
2. International Islamic News Agency
3. Islamic States Broadcasting Organization
4. Islamic Chamber of Commerce, Industry, and Commodity Exchange
5. Islamic Capitals Organization
6. Islamic Shipowners Association
7. Islamic Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

SOURCE: ME, Special ICO Supplement, August 1983.

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NOTES

For the place and frequency of publications cited here, and for the full name of the publication, news agency, radio station or monitoring service where an abbreviation is used, please see 'List of Sources.' Only in the case of more than one publication bearing the same name is the place of publication noted here.

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2. Text of final statement, R. Rabat, 22 January—SWB, 24 January 1983.
3. R. Rabat, 24 January—SWB, 29 January 1983.
4. Interview with *Kull al-'Arab*, 29 June 1983.
5. Interview with *al-Sharq al-Awsat*, 26 October—DR, 3 November 1982.
6. ME, Special ICO supplement, August 1983. For broader background to the ICO's involvement, see Georges Fischer, 'Une tentative de protection internationale d'une minorité: la Conférence islamique et les musulmanes philippines', *Annuaire français de Droit international*, 23 (1977), pp. 325-41.
7. Chatti's comments, *al-Riyād*, 7 September 1983.
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9. History of the initiative in *al-Nadwa*, 7 June 1983.
10. Text of speech, Riyadh Television, 7 June—SWB, 21 June; *al-Sharq al-Awsat*, 8 June; *al-Nadwa*, 8 June 1983.
11. Ibid.
12. *Al-Nadwa*, 8 June 1983.
13. *The Muslim World*, 18 June 1983.
14. Editorial in *Jumhuriyye Islami*, 13 June; IRNA, 13 June—SWB, 15 June 1983.
15. WP, 16 June 1983.
16. Saudi Ministry of Interior statement, R. Riyadh, 8 October—SWB, 11 October; Iranian Foreign Ministry statement, R. Tehran, 8 October—SWB, 11 October 1982.
17. R. Tehran, 10 October—SWB, 12 October 1982.
18. Hadi Khameneh'i's interview with *Ettela'at*, 28 December 1982.
19. Khomeyni's speech, *Ettela'at*, 3 January; R. Tehran, 2 January—DR, 3 January; Montazeri's speech, *Ettela'at*, 4 January; R. Tehran, 3 January—DR, 4 January; Khameneh'i's Arabic sermon, R. Tehran in Arabic, 31 December—DR, 5 January 1983.
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26. IRNA, 12 July—DR, 13 July 1983.
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32. Developments in resistance are recounted and a breakdown of resistance groups given in *Libération*, 23 December—JPRS, 17 January 1983.
33. FR, 22 September 1983.
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36. ST, 24 April 1983.
37. TT, 27 March 1983.

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40. *FR*, 17 March 1983.
41. *NYT*, 1 April; *FR*, 21 April 1983.
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49. *Al-Thawra*, Baghdad, 17 April 1983.
50. Text of final statement, *al-Thawra*, Baghdad, 19 April 1983.
51. *INA*, 20, 23 April—DR, 20, 26 April 1983.
52. R. Tripoli, 21 October—SWB, 23 October 1983.
53. *Al-Fajr al-Jadīd*, 25, 26 December 1982.
54. *Al-Fajr al-Jadīd*, 13, 14, 15 October: *The Jamahiriya Mail*, 16, 23 October 1982.
55. *Al-Da'wa al-Islāmiyya*, 29 June 1983.
56. *Al-Zahf al-Akhdar*, 16 August 1982.
57. *FR*, 24 February 1983.
58. *Akhbār al-'Ālam al-Islāmī*, 22 September 1982.
59. Account of Council meeting, *Akhbār al-'Ālam al-Islāmī*, 15 November 1982.
60. *'Ukāz*, 2 June 1983.
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62. Account of Kuala Lumpur portion of journey in *Akhbār al-'Ālam al-Islāmī*, 27 December 1982, 3 January 1983.
63. Accounts of Jakarta portion of journey and Council deliberations, *Akhbār al-'Ālam al-Islāmī*, 13 December 1982, 17, 31 January 1983.
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68. Account of DMI's first year of operation in *Euromoney*, December 1982.
69. *MEED*, 26 November 1982.
70. *The Muslim World*, 16 April 1983.
71. *The Muslim World League Journal*, February-March 1983.
72. *May*, 28 February; *MENA*, 27 February—SWB, 2 March 1983.
73. On the resolutions of each of the eight previous congresses, see J. Jomier, 'Les congrès de l'Académie des Recherches Islamiques dépendant de l'Azhar', *Mélanges de l'Institut Dominicain des Etudes Orientales du Caire*, vol. 14 (1980), pp. 95-148; current activities of the Academy described in *al-Liwā al-Islāmī*, 17 March 1983.
74. Account of the Academy's financial situation in *al-Musawwar*, 26 May 1978.
75. Text of resolutions and recommendations in *Majallat al-Azhar*, April; cf. *al-Ahrām*, 25 March 1983.
76. Special issue of *Minbar al-Islām*, March; *Majallat al-Azhar*, April; *al-Ahrām*, 19-23 March; *The Guardian*, 19 March; *NYT*, 20 March 1983.
77. *Al-Ahrām*, 18-19 March; list of over 200 invited guests from abroad, *Majallat al-Azhar*, April 1983.

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78. Text of Mubārak's speech, *al-Ahrām*, 20 March; *Minbar al-Islām*, April 1983.
79. Table with country-by-country breakdown of foreign student population in the special issue of *Minbar al-Islām*, March 1983.
80. *Al-Liwā al-Islāmī*, 17 March 1983.
81. Description of challenge to Egyptian religious functionaries abroad, *al-Nūr*, 16 February; *al-Madīna*, 15 July 1983.
82. Text of declaration, *Haqiqate Enqelabe Sawr*, 25 October 1982—JPRS, 12 January 1983.
83. Khatami's interview with R. Tehran, 25 June—SWB, 28 June 1983.
84. R. Tehran, 5 July—DR, 5 July 1983.
85. Interview with IRNA, 3 August—DR, 4 August 1983.
86. Text of protest, R. Tehran, 20 July—SWB, 22 July 1983.
87. Text of letter, IRNA, 23 July—SWB, 26 July 1983.
88. R. Tehran, 22 July—SWB, 25 July 1983.
89. R. Riyadh, 27 July—SWB, 27 July 1983.
90. R. Tehran in Arabic, 27 July—SWB, 28 July; interview with Iranian pilgrimage official, R. Tehran, 26 July—DR, 27 July 1983.
91. R. Tehran, 1 August—DR, 2 August 1983.
92. R. Tehran, 2 August—DR, 3 August; *Kayhan*, 3 August 1983.
93. Interview with Saudi Minister of Pilgrimage Affairs and *Waqfs*, R. Riyadh, 4 August—SWB, 6 August 1983.
94. Khomeyni's speech, R. Tehran, 2 August—SWB, 4 August 1983.
95. IRNA, 16 September—SWB, 19 September 1983.
96. Kho'iniha's remarks, R. Tehran, 27 August—DR, 29 August; IRNA, 3 September—DR, 6 September 1983.
97. R. Tehran, 29 August—DR, 30 August 1983.
98. IRNA, 3 September—DR, 6 September; *Kayhan*, 3 September 1983.
99. Report on atmosphere in Mecca, R. Tehran, 11 September—DR, 12 September 1983.
100. IRNA, 8 September—DR, 9 September 1983.
101. SPA, 11 September—DR, 12 September 1983.
102. Khatami's message of 12 September, R. Tehran, 13 September—DR, 14 September; *Kayhan*, 13 September 1983.
103. Kho'iniha's speech, *Kayhan*, 14 September 1983.
104. Account of demonstration, R. Tehran, 13 September—DR, 14 September 1983.
105. JANA, 14 September—SWB, 16 September 1983.
106. IRNA, 16 September—DR, 19 September 1983.
107. Report on Kho'iniha's return, R. Tehran in Arabic, 29 September—SWB, 1 October; *Kayhan*, 1 October 1983.
108. R. Tehran, 2 August—SWB, 4 August 1983.